
Moments that Mattered

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The Fight for Soviet Jewry



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הפגנות-הפלקרים נגד רוטה המובייטית

קיימות חילוקי-דעות בנוגע לדריכים ולתגבורות שעליינו לאחיזה בהן נגד היחס של המובייטים לאחיזה במדינה זו. אמנים אפשר למצוא נימוקים הוגנים ונכונים — בכדי לאחיזה בשיטת המתחאות הפומביות ותוסערות. כי על ידי כך — טוביים — יועזו ויסערו את דעת-הקהל העולמי וייתכן שתבא הנחה לסובלים. ויש שבאים מוכחים את ההפן. אוטרים הם שדריכי המתחאות וההטערות עלילות להטיח תלייה שואה ושתפונן של צרות נספות ח"ז ליהודי רוטה. ברם דבר אחד ברור, שכונפה של פטודנטים נרגומים אליהם להיות הפטודנטים והטוריים עם ישראל כולם.

אמנים יש להם לפטודנטים תפקיד היסטורי וטהורתי להתקיף את הבטילות ולעלות בחומות ולצאת החוץ נגד כל ממשלה שאינה קרובת לכלם ובכל אחר ואחר בו מתרחשים פגעים פוליטיים וצבוריים ידי הפטודנטים באמצעות ובמטרה הלהטים.

והנה באמריקה — מדינה יוצאת מן הכלל — אין להם לפטודנטים שם "עבודה" היסטורית. אמנים קרה נס ונדטנה צרת וויטנאם, רועשים קצת הפטודנטים הכלילום הגויים ונוגנים עצות לנשיא דזונסון...

אבל מה יעשו הפטודנטים היהודיים, אלה הבוחרים המפונקים והחטניים עלי חלב ודבש. מה יעשו הבנים האלה? הדם רותח והצורך להתרחק במקצת, באים הם ועורכיהם הפגנות נגד רוטה. הפגנות שלפי הכנתם ושיקול דעתם יביאו ישועות ונחמות לישראל ברוסיה.

אבל יש לומר בקול רם: אל לנו להרשות בשם פנים שככל הרוצה לארגן מני הפגנות כאלה יבא וויארגן. הפגנות אלה הן טרגדיות ומפוכגות מאד. את הפטודנטים החפשיים אין אלו שואלים מי הוא זה שליח אתכם. אבל את הפטודנטים בני היישובות מן ההכרח שהוא נשאל בקול רם: מי בקש ואת מידכם? מי הוא זה שהסבירים מעודד אתכם למעשים מסוכנים ובلتיאחדאים באלה? שואלים אלו אתם שאלת זו בכל תקופה החריפות והמרירות.

כל מפגין שביניכם הוא רודף לשלתם המילויגים של יהודי רופיה. ורודף הוא כל אחד שטארנן הפגנות כאלו, בכיוול, לשם המערה מצפון העולם נגד הרודנים המובייטים. מי יודע אם איןכם לא רק רודפים כי אם רוצחים ומכעירים אש, ובمدת דתיתו של הפטודנט המשתתף בן גודלה אשמהנו ונורא הוא פשוט. ואין הטעותם הריקנים האלה מוצדקים אף בשםיאים להפגה אחד „טנייד שיעור"...

מתפעלים אתם: הסינטור דושאוויז ינאם. הסינטור רוברט קנדי ישא מחייב וכ"ו. כן, כן אלה הגוזלים מקבלים שכר טוב עבר עקרותיהם. זקנים חם לקלות הבוחרים היהודיים. זכר ונזכר יודע נדע את עדינותה ורגשותה של אמריקה עת טילוני היהודים הובילו לטבה. אז אתם הנשייא רזבלט את אזני משמע ונעל דלחות ה„בית-הלבן" ולא נתן למשחת היהודים בת טאות רבנים — שחיכתה בדור איום בחוץ — לבא אליו פניתה לחיל הדיפלומטי האמריקאית אי לזאת גם עתה אל לנו להשלוות את עצמנו ולהתרפס לפני הסינטורים המבעים טහאות נגד רומי לטובת היהודים...

שאלתנו של ארגון מחות פומביות נגד רוטה היא שאלת פיקוח נפש הנוגעת למילוינט. עבר בצד בלא זיהיר ובלתי חשוב עלולים אנו להיות



מנוקמים שבעתים. ואם זה עניין של פיקוח נפש הרי מחויבת הפטודנטים בני היישוב ליטול עצה ותוישת לא מפוליטיים בלבד כי גם מראשי ישיבה, גדולי תורה בעלי-האחריות.

וירגנד נא כאן ברורות: שאין אף גדול אחד — מהטוכרים והטומכים — שהוציא פטקדין שנפגין נגד רוסיה באותו הדרכיהם שטורר היה להשתמש בהם למדינה אחרת. ובוודאי שאין אחד מראשי-הישיבה שליח את תלמידיו להפגין ועל אכו"כ שם רבי-אדמו"ר לא שלח את חסידיו להעתיד טשمرות ע"י השגירות הרוסית.

ואל נא יתemptו את הטוחות בהשואות לחורבן היטלר באמרים: די שלטנו עברו שתיקתנו ואדיישותנו. שתקנו או... ולכון אל לנו לשתקך יותר.

ואני אומר: גם או שטמנו מחר אוום עבור אי-השתיקה, הלוואוי והיין יודעים לשתק גם אז, כי אז ייתכן כי היטלר לא היה היה איזמה וטורפת כו. הלוואוי והיין או — מרגע הראשון של השתלטוו של היטלר, משתמשים בתכסים היישן נושן שלנו של השתדלות של שודר וכו', ולא תיינו מארגנים את החרום-בציקאט נגד תוכרת גרמניה. באותו היום והנמר שהרוננו חרים נגד מחירות גרמניה בו ביום נחרך הנורדים על הסוף הטרגי של מיליון יהודים. והרבה אמנס הרעישו אז נגד החרום באמרים: לא זו הדרך, לא תמיד מותר להתגרות עם רשות כזו. אבל אנו נטשכנו אחרי העולם המודרני שלנו "שהצהיר" מלחמה בהיטלר ימ"ש. ועבור אישתיקתנו שלטנו מחר אוום ונורא.

אל לנו לשוכוח כי עוזנו בಗלוות אנחנו והני הוא גוי כמקדמת דנא, מלא שנהה, רציחה וקנאה. והיות שאנו מתחאים להשבich את הנער שלנו אודות מציאותנו בಗלוות, הרי מლטים אנו את ידינו לקרב ואת אגרופנו למלחמה הפוגנות. אל לנו לשכח שעליינו להיות באיטה מתמדת מפני הגוי האורב לנו במטחים. הוא אורב לנו, ומוראו עליינו בಗלוות, אף אחרי תקומה מדינת ישראל.لال אמריקה היא ג"כ מדינה לא קטנה מדינת ישראל, ובכל זאת זהירה היא בשבעים מיני זהירות לא להריגו את הדבר האום להפכו לדב שכול טורף ורומט. במקום ההפגנות הרעות והגנות הנלחבים יש מקום לעבודה שקטה, יעילה ופעילה.

הננו מקדמים בברכה חמת את פניכם

הגאון ר' איסר יהודה אונטרמאן שליט"א

הרבי הראשי לא"י

לבואו לביקור קצר לארצות הברית.

יה"ר שע"י שליחותו יתרנה כבוד שמות וכבוד התורה.

מערכת "הפרדס"

אין מכוונתי בכתביה זו לשם התגנות או בקורות מצער אנו כי על המצב וחייב שבכל מהלך הוועידה לא הושמעה האנאה היהודית העמוקה, בה בשעה שיש כל כך הרבה על מה להיאנה.

הניסי החדש שנכתב בוועידה האחרון של "הסתדרות הרבנים", כפי שאומרים לנו איש מתון ובכלל ניטוסין. המצב הנוכחי דורש כמובן: אחדות. ואם לא אפשר אחדות אידיאלית על כל ארץ הארץ, אבל קיימים שטחים שאפשר למצוא כר נרחב לעובדה משותפת. ואמנם שזה לא פעם שנעשה כמו נסונות שלא הצליחו, ואחריו דגש של קירוב נאלצים להיפרד. אבל לא אבודה תקורתנו שכן ישנה דרך לשיתוף פעולה — אם ההסתדרות הרבנית תשנה את דרכה הסלולה — והעשתה מאמצים להבין לרוחנו. ונמצא שם הרבה הכרמים, חשובים שטחכויותינו מחשבותיהם, והשקפותינו השקפותיהם.

עמדת אגודת הרבנים בעניין הפגנות למן היהודי רוסיה *

1975

מהקשר לשימושות שנות, שאגודת הרבנים באורה"ב וקנאה שניתה את עמידתה עד פה, ביחס להפגנות נגר ברית המועצות, מוצאים אנו לחובה להבהיר בדלקמן:

1) אגודת הרבנים מוסיפה להחזיק בעמדת שנקבעה על ידי גורלי הזר המטוטטמים ביותר, ובראשם הגרא"א קווטלר זצ"ל וגדולי ארץ ישראל, שלא לקחת חלק פעיל במבצעים ומפעליות מפוזרים שהחשבים כי עלייתם יעוזו לדודות רוסיה. עד כמה שתהיה כוונתם של כל הדימוריות והמפעשי של הארגונים השותפים לטבות היהודים ברופיה, אינט' יפוליט', ככל זאת, לאחפאים תמיד לכל השתנות והדימוריות העולימות לניגום ח"ז לנצחאות מפואנות.

את פלוט הזרדים בדאגה לגורל יהדות רופיה, ואת עשיים הכל באמציעים תורתיים כדי להביא חalice וחקלה ליוזמות רופיה.

2) מצער הדבר שהשתמשו במקتاب כללי שלו, שבו אני מתח שבכל יהודים שפועלים למן כל ישראל בשם שם שם בכל ארץ שהוא, יברטו על כך ממשם.

רב משה פינשטיין, נשיא אגודת הרבנים

RAB MOSEH FINSTEIN

סגי ממחבת לבג, בה חשב עיקמת שפטים מעשה (זדק ושכח שטברא זז היא סברת הק"ץ צה"ת לעיל) ומוסבר היטב פלוגתא זז' יתנו ר' יאשיה בפרט נדרים עיי' שליח דתתם וԶא אין זה מדין מחשבה אלא מדין דיבור שבעי לגלות מה שחשב בלבבו, ומעיקר הדין מחשבת הלב סגי בכה"ג חשוב הדיבור מיili בעלתנא אבל לאו הדיבור ווא מעיקר הדין אמר בלשון הטעם מותר ליכי לא אמר כלום.

(המשך מעת' 23)

זצ"ל, שחידש שם בספרו סימן א' דהא דיבדור אינט' וחשיב. מעשה אלא מיili בעלמא הינו דזקא היכי דאיינו מדין דיבור זזא אלא משום שבעי לגלות מה שחשב בלבבו, ומעיקר הדין מחשבת הלב סגי בכה"ג חשוב הדיבור מיili בעלתנא אבל לאו הדיבור ווא מעיקר הדין הימט דכעוי דיבור בהוצאה שפטוי זזא ולא

(3)

אגודת הרבנים: יהודות התורה לא השתתפה בהפגנת המחאה בושינגטון נגד מיכאל גורבאצ'וב

אגודת הרבנים דארה'ב וקנדה פירסמה הודעה מיוחדת בעקבות הפגנת המחאה שנערכה בושינגטון ערב בואו של המנהיג הסובייטי, מיכائيل גורבאצ'וב, לפגישת הפיטה שלו עם נשיא ארה'ב, מר רונאלד רייגן, בה היא מצינית את היענות הגדולה לקריאה שלה ערבי ההפגנה, שלא ליטול בה חלק, כדי שלא לגרום סכנה ליודי רוסיה.

* בהודעה של אגודת הרבנים נאמר: פנויתנו לכל יהודי אמריקה להימנע מארגון הפגנות רعنויות נגד רוסי הסובייטית בעת הביקור הרשמי של מר גורבאצ'וב בושינגטון, זכתה להד גдол ב הציבור היהודי, במיוחד בעולם התורני, לא רק באמריקה אלא גם בארצות אחרות, בישראל ובארצות אירופה, ובכל מקום שם דברנו הגי. עמדת אגודת הרבנים שביטהה את דעת תורה של גולי הדור הנודעים ביותר, וביניהם הגודלים נוחי עדן הגאון ר' אהרון קופלר צ'יל, חכר הנשיאות של אגודת הרבנים והגאון ר' משה פיינשטיין צ'יל, נשיא אגודת הרבנים, התקבלה בשביות רצון גדולת על ידי כל גולי ישראל, ללא יוצא מהכלל, בינויהם הרבנים הגדולים ביותר, אדמוירים וראשי ישיבות, אשר הזדרו עם עמדת אגודות הרבנים.

יש לציין, כי אף אחד מן האדמוניים, שאלפי, אלף חסידים נהרים אחרים, בתוכם ליבאוייטש, סטמאר, בוכוב, קלזינגרג, מונקאטש, סקוודר ואחרים – אף אחד מהם לא קרא לחסידיו להשתתף באויה הפגנה. אף אחד מכל ראשי היישוב לא התיר ל תלמידיו להיות בין המפוגנים ולא נמצא גם אף רב מובהק אחד, כזה שמשיר בתרתו וכיראו את המסורה של רבעות מקורית, לא קרא למ��ללי בית הכנסת ולבעל הבית שלו – ליטול חלק בהפגנה שנערכה בושינגטון. בועידה האחרון של אגודת ישראל יזאו ראשי המדබרים, בינויהם שנים מחברי "מועצת גולי תורה", ואחד מחשובי זקני הרבנים, שהשמיע את הנאים המרכז, בדברים חריפים נגד ההפגנה, בהציגם על התוצאות השליליות שהפגנות כאלה עלולות לגרום, ואין לשכוח, הם הדגישו, כי גם ביום אנחנו עדין בגלות ואסור להשתמש באמצעות העולמים לגרות עוד יותר את רוסי הסובייטית. אגודת הרבנים כבר הוכרה בהודעותיה הקודמות חלק מדבורי של הגאון ר' משה פיינשטיין צ'יל, בכנותו את המפוגנים ברודפי כלל ישראל. רב משה צ'יל גם ביש אישית מי שהי הרב הראשי של מוסקבה באותו זמן, לעת שכיר באמריקה, כי מסור למשלה הסובייטית כי ליהודים שומרי התורה אין שום שיוכות לאיזו שהן הפגנות פומביות או לכל מיini מפוגנים פומביים אחרים שאין דעת חכמים נוחה מהם.

בздמנות זו מן הרואי להציג את השאלה: מי הם מנהיגי ישראל שקרו לקיים אותה הפגנה? יהדות התורה, ברובו הגדל, לא הייתה בין המארגנים. ממתי נעשו רפורמים וחיצי רפורמים מנהיגים של כלל ישראל ומכתיבים לייחודה הדתית כיצד לנחות ולפעול בשאלות כה חמורות של פיקוח-נפש; ומציקה מאוד השאלה שaina נתנת מנוח: למה המפוגנים המודרניים הללו לא אירגנו מפגני-מחאה בעת שהיטר השמץ מילוני יהודים? ומה לא נסעו או לוושינגטון כדי להרעיש את הבית הלבן ולזעוק על הכאב הנוראי?

ומי כן נסע או לוושינגטון? חברי אגודת הרבנים נסעו או. משלחת גדולה של מאות רבנים, בראשות נשיאו, הגאון ר' אליעזר סילבר צ'יל, נסעה לבית הלבן והרטיבו בדמעותיהם החמות את הקירות הלבנים של הבית הלבן. ולא כל כך קל לחת תשובה לשאלת הטרagit הזו.

בздמנות זו מוכרים אנו למחות בצורה החריפה ביותר נגד אלה המיעדים, באמצעות נימוק-ושא שונים, לנחות מדעת-התורה של אוניב הדור הגדולים ביותר, אשר ראו בכל ההפגנה הללו סכנה גדולה ליודי רוסי ומילא גם לכל כלל ישראל. דבר אחד ברור למלילה מכל ספק, יהדות ההיסטוריה מכדרעה דעת תורה של גולי וקדושים ישראל, ולגמר לא "דעת תורה" של הנשיא רייגן, שיא-אליה רבנים מסתמכים עליו.

וכחישד היה שקבל המطبع בחזרה לפני משורת הדין שמלל מקום יש לו תרומות על חברו לפי סלאקה דעתה בוגרמא, ולא דחו אלא מפני שלא היה צריך לקבל את המطبع כלל אבל אלמלא טעם זה התרומות מותרת לו לכתילה שהרי מירוי בחסיד ועיין במסכת סוכה דף נ"ג עמוד א' וציריך לאמר שהתרומות היא לחשולת להרחק מעשה הפסדר ש אדם עושה לחברו ועיין בספר חפץ חיים כלל י' וצ"ע, או שהיא מעין כופין בדברים לפנים משורת הדין עיין בחושן משפט סימן י"ב בפתחי חסובה סעיף קטן ו' אלא שם אינו אלא בבית דין. ולפי זה בגיןז שאותה טוען הרבה אחד הפדר ממד סכום גדול במרמה מותר להתרעם עליו אף על פי שאינך יכול לתובעו בדיון, אבל אחרים אסורים להעביר את הדברים.

זהודה ורצל הגקי

רבות במקרא. וכך במסכת בא בתרא דף ט"ז עמוד א' דריש על הכתוב בפרק א' שם וכעתה צורתה גם כעס בעבור הרעימה עכ"ל שפנינה בקשה לגרום לכך שחנה מהפלל כי תפללה היא בפה, ובמסכת ברכות דף י"ב עמוד א' תרומות המינין עכ"ל היא דבר בפה וכן הוא בתוספתא מסכת סותה פרק ו' הלכה א' ועוד מקומות, וכן פרש"י בספר במדבר שם שהריעימו עליו את כל העדה בהוצאה דבה עכ"ל כלומר שהמרגלים גרמו לעם להחלונן בפה על משה. ובמסכת בא ברוא דף ה' עמוד א' בד"ה ולא גברא בעית לאכליי פרש"י להזעיק ולגעור בתן ירעם מתרגמי' אכלי וכו' כל לשון הכרזה בתרגום יונתן עכ"ל, ובכחמת שלמה גרש אכליי לשון הרמת קול ירעם מתרגמי' וכו' עכ"ל.

הרי שמי לחברו גרים לו נזק מותר להוציאו עליו דבר אמרת לפרש"י אף על פי שאינו יכול לתבעו,

ר' YEHUDAH HERZL
HENKIN
b. 1945

סימן גא

הפגנות למן יהודי רוסיה

האם ההפגנות שלכם דומות לו של ר' יהודה בן שמואל וחביריו ונתקדק בסוגיא מלאה במלה, הם התיעצו במטרוניתא אחת שכל גdots רומי היו מצויין אצלם עכ"ל שהיתה נכירה כמו שפרש"י במסכת שבת דף קכ"ז עמוד ב', וכן סתם מטרוניתא בתלמוד היה נכירה עיין במסכת שבת דף פ"א עמוד ב' ויום א' דף פ"ד עמוד א' ובבא מציעא דף פ"ד עמוד ב', וрокח מיטרונית נדרים דף נ' עמוד א' אפשר שהמטרוניתא שם הייתה יהודית לפי מה שכתבו המפרשים שללותה לרבי עקיבא והזכירה שם שמים, וכן בירושלמי מסכת סוטה פרק ג' הלכה ד' היהת יהודית. ויהודה בן שמואל וחביריו התיעצו בה עצמן ולא שלחו על ידי שליח אוף שלא היה זה בכבודם לילכת אליה עיין במסכת שבת דף קי"ד שם ובמסכת קドושין דף ל"ט עוד ב'. והיא יעצה להפיגנו ופרש"י צעקו בשוקים וברחובות כדי שישמעו השרים וירחמו עליהם עכ"ל ועיין בעורך ערד פגן וערך בגין, ואמרה בוואו והפיגנו עכ"ל ולא לכון והפיגנו כי דירתה הייתה בין הרומים ולכן אמרה להם לבוא לשכונת הרומים משכונות היהודים.

ביה, ח' חנוכה תשמ"ה - 7/12/12/1

לשואל אחר

אהורי השועורים אצלם שאלות ההפגנות למען יהודי רוסיה בכללה וההפגנה הגדולה בוואשינגטון שהשתתפת בה בפרט. המקור להפיגין הוא במסכת ראש השנה דף י"ט עמוד א' ותענית דף י"ח עמוד א' חיל בעשרים ותמניא ביה אתה בשורתה טבתא להיהודים דלא יעדין מאוריתא שגורה המלכות גורה שלא יעסכו בתורה ושלא ימולו את בניהם ושיחלו שבתות, מה עשה יהודה בן שמואל וחביריו הלבכו ונטלו עצה ממטרוניתא אחת שכל גdots רומי מצויין אצלם אמרה להם בוואו הפיגינו בלילה הלבכו והפיגינו בלילה אמרו אי שמי לא אחיכם אנחנו ולא בני אב אחד אנחנו ולא בני אמרת אם אחת אנחנו מה נשתנו מכל אומה שאתם גוררים עליינו גורמות קשות וכו' עכ"ל והיא בריאות במסכת תענית פרק י"ב בקצת שניים. הרי גם ביום הגמרה הפיגינו ולכן אין להשגיה במני שכותב שכולן הן נגד התורה, ברם ציריך למודע



ליידי סכנה, וגם כדי שיכלו רבים להפגין כי בלילה הכל פנויים מעובדה וגם הנשים תוכלנה להגinya את ילדייהם.

ועתה נשווה בין הפגנת ר' יהודה בן שמואל ותבריו להפגנותיהם שלם. בזמן הגمرا הפגינו מפני ביתול לימוד תורה ומיליה ושבת גם היום אין להפגין אלא بعد דבריהם שנפש ישראלי תלויות בהם, אכן שהם שנה שנאסר ברוסיה ללימוד תורה ברבאים וכבר צוחו קמאי על גורת השמד * וכולו איתנו בה כי מאחר שאסרו להכשיר מוהלים הוא כgorah שלא למול ומאותר שאנכם לומדים דת יהודית כיצד ישרמו שבת. ומה שנאמר בבריתא שיחללו שבת עכ"ל אין פרושו שהרומנים הכריחו אותם לקטוף קניין באגמא בשבתא אלא שקבעו סדרי החיים אי אפשר לשמור שבת, וכן שוגם בארץות הברית דעכה דת יהודית עד לפניה שבעים שנה שאו עברו הגויים לשבע עובודה של חמישה ימים ושוב לא הוציאו היהודים לעבדם שבתות.

ובימי הבריתא הפגינו כדי שיישמעו השרים כפרשיי וכן בהפגנותם של הימים מתאפסים במקום פומבי, ורבי הפגינים עושים רושם וההפגנה מתפרסמת על ידי כל התקשות ונודעת לשולטנות רוסיה מיילו היהת במקומם ועדיף מןנו כי יותר רגושים לדעת הציבור בעולם, ואפילו אם אינה מועילה להפגנה במקומם הלא ברוסיה אי אפשר להפגין ואין דנים אפשר מאי אפשר. ולפי מה שכחתי שר' יהודה בן שמואל וחבריו הפגינו בלילה כדי שלא לבוא לידי סכנה שפיר מפגינים היום בארץ רחקה, וכן לפי שאר הטיעמים שהפגינו בלילה מפני שאו שקט ופינוי מעובדה הוא הדין באלה"ב בימי ראשון. ואך שאתם תובעים לחת ליהודי רוסיה זכות הגירה שאינה ניתנת לשאר עםים ושלא כמו שאמרו בגمرا מה נשתנו מכל אומה וכו' עכ"ל, על כרחן הנוסח איינו עיקר כמו שכחתי למלחה, וכי שיר לבקש שוויון זכויות ברוסיה והלא מונעים מכל העמים ללמד דת לילדיהם ואין לך גורת שמד גודלה מזו, וכל יהודי חייב לברוח מתחת יד שלטון כזה כמו שכח ברמב"ם בהלכות יסודית התורה פרק ה' הלכה ד', וממילא חייבם לעשות כל הצדקי להוציא את היהודים משם ובתנאי שיפגינו

* (הנ"ה) עיין חשיבות איברא סימן קכ"ב.

ואמרה להם להפגין בלילה, ופרש מהרש"א שצעקה ובכיה בלילה יותר נשמעת לרוחם עכ"ל וכן דרשו באיכה רבה פרשה א' על המכוב בכיה תבכה בלילה לפי שאין הקול הולך אלא בלילה עכ"ל. ועיין בערך ערך רב שtabia גוסח אחר, וזה למה בלילה שלא היה קולם חולך ביום משום מרבות הימים עכ"ל פי' מהירותם היום עיין באבן עוזרא בויקרא פרק ז' על הכתוב מרבת תבינה והוא מפורסם רב סעדיה גאון על התורה, ולפי זה בלילה לאו דוקא אלא הוא הדין נשמע הקול ביום אם אינם ממהרים בו וכגון שהיומ פגוי מעובדה. ומה שיטים המהרש"א בלילה נשמעת לרוחם עכ"ל ממשמע שرك קול בכיה נשמעת בלילה ולא קול אחר, נראה שבא להוסיף את הפרוש השני במדרש שם שלילה מושך עימה קינה עכ"ל, אבל לפירוש הראשון כל צעה נשמעת בלילה וכן מוכת במסכת בבא קמא דף קי"ד עמוד ב' שמי שנגנב מבנו עמד והפגין בלילה כדי לפרטם הגנבה.

ותוכן הפגנת ר' יהודה בן שמואל וחבריו היה שצעקו אי שמים לא אחיכם אנחנו ולא בני אב אחד אנחנו וכו' מה נשתנו מכל אומה וכו' עכ"ל שפנו לרגשי הדת והצדקה, וגם לא בקשנו טובה מיוחדת אלא שלא יופלו לרעה, ורק אינו מבואר האם המתrownית יעצה לומר לנו או שם עצמן בחורו את הנוסח והראשון נראה יותר. על כל פנים הנוסח אינו מעכ卜 כי בודאי רק מפני שהרומים הניו לשרור דתות לנו אמרו מה נשתנו וכו' עכ"ל, אבל הגע עצמד אילו הרומים היו אסורים גם את שאר הפלותנים להבדיל האם או היו ר' יהודה בן שמואל וחבריו שותקים. ועוד לע"ד השתדלו אצל השלטונות תחילת כמו במסכת מעילה דף י"ז עמוד א' מי ילד ויבטל הגורות וכו' עכ"ל כי מי פטוי להסתכן לנצח לרחותם אם יכול להעביר את הגורה בדרך שקטה, ורק ככל נגענו הלו ונטלו עצה והפגינו. וכיון שכבר השתדלו אצל השלטונות ללא הועל מה יוסיפו עתה אם יצעקו בודדים ברחובות, אלא בודאי צרפו אתם את רוב בני ישראל שבאותו מקום ואולי אף מן הנשים והטף שkolon נשמע יותר לרוחם וויל בתור טעם ההפגנה, ונרמז בכתב בכיה תבכה בלילה בלשון נקבה, וזה שאמרו מה נשתנו מכל אומה עכ"ל כלומר שהפגינו כאומה ולא כבודדים. ומכאן עוד טעם להפגין בלילה דומיא דמתחרת כדי שלא יכירו אותם לאור יום ויבאו

לهم דעת ואינם יודעים לשנות ותוליט עצם בדעת
גדולים בזמן ובמקום שתלו לא דברו, ורבה קלוקלים
ובועים מזה.

ומצד שני מה שאומרים קצת רבנים שיש חיזב להפגין
משום פדיון שבויים ומשום לא תעמוד על דם
רעד אינו נראה לע"ד, כי אין כאן פדיון יהודי רוסיה
אין בגדר שבויים זולת מי שנמצא בבית הסוחר או
במחנה כפיה וגם אינם בסכנת נפשות, ועיין במא
שכתבי בוני בנים [חילק א'] סימן מ"ב עמוד קנ"ד
וקנ"ה שחייב הצללה תלוי בראשית העין ושם תורתה
אינו חייב להציל אם שומע בלבד על סכנת חברו
באرض רוחקה. איברא במשלי פרק כ"ד נאמר הצלל
לקחתים למות ומיטים להרוג אם תהשוך עכ"ל וmoboa
ברמבי"ם הלכות מתנות עניינים פרק ח' הלהבה י', והמשך
הכתוב הוא כי אמר הן לא ידענו זה הלא תכן לבות
הוא מבין ונצר נפשך הוא ידע והשיב לאדם כפועלו
עכ"ל הרי שנאמר לא ידענו ולא נאמר לא ראיינו
ואלמא חייב מדברי קבלה להציל את חברו גם כשרק
ידעו בסכנה שלו, ומיהו אין זה אלא בלקוחים למות.

ואולם סיום הפסוק במשלי והשיב לאדם כפועלו עכ"ל
שייך בכל הטבת אדם לחברו, ואין לך גמilot
חסדים יותר מהצללה גופם ונפשם ונפשות ילדי היהודים
רוסיה על ידי הוצאותם ממש. והוא חייב עשה מואהבת
לרען כמוון, ועומק כוונת הכתוב הוא שם תאהב את
חברך ותגמול לו חסדים הרי הוא כמור כי הקב"ה
משיב לאדם כפועלו ומה שגמלת לחברך הקב"ה יגמול
 לך ונמצא שאהבת וgamlat טוב לעצמד וזהו כמוון.
ולכן אמרו במסכת עבדה זורה דף י"ז עמוד א' שככל
העובד בתורה בלבד ואינו עוסק בגמilot חסדים דומה
כמי שאין לו אלוה עכ"ל ודילקו לאמר שדומה כאילו
דוקא לו אין אלות, כי מראה שאינו מאמין שעל ידי
גמilot חסדים מטיב לעצמו ונמצא כופר שהקב"ה
משיב לו כפועלו. ואשריכם שאתם עוסקים במצבה זו
וחthonkenet ידי כל המסייעים.

יהודה הרצל הנקי

בדרכ צעקה ובקשה כמו שעשו בבריתא ולא על ידי
התగורות ואיהם. ויש להתייעץ במומחים ואפילו
במומחים נקרים כמו שנTELו עצה מהמתrownיתא, ועם
יהיה על פי דעת גדולים ובתנאי שהגדולים עצם
יתיעזו במומחים כמו שעשו ר' יהודה בן שמואל
וחבריו.

ומה שאלת על שאות מארגוני הרובנים בארץות
הברית פרנס איסור להפגין בשם הגרא"מ
פיינשטיין ז"ל ואילו ארגון רבני אחר תחק בהפגנה
לפי מה שאמր להם בשעתו הגרא"ד סולובייצ'יק
שליט"א, הנה לע"ד כיוון שענין ההפגנות נלמד מהגמרא
ורק צריך לבדוק לפני כל הפגנה האם תצמח ממנה
תועלות או לא כמו שכתבי, لكن הוא עניין במציאות
ואין סומכים על מה שאמרו בו לפני עשר שנים כי
הרבה השתנה מאה. כל שכן לפני דבריך שאלת את
הגרמ"פ ז"ל בשנת תשמ"א ואמר לך שאין איסור
להפגין וכן שמעתי מהתנו שליט"א שחמיין לא היה
איסור היום, ולכן אף שאין בדברים אלה כדי לפרטם
היתר בשם אבל גם לא שייך לפרטם איסור בשמנן.
ועוד שאלת את הגרא"י קאמינצקי ז"ל ולבריך אמר
לך שהתנגד להפגנות בעבר מפני מה שתכיר את רוסיה
מלפני שנים אבל אם השתנו הענינים שוב איינו איסור.
וידעו שגם הגמוני וצלה"ה תמיד התנגד להפגנות,
אבל שברבו בצדו שאמר שבענייני מציאות אי אפשר
לසמוך על דברי הגדולים שבבעבר כי המציאות משתנית
ואילו היו חיים הימים שמא היו אמורים אחרת*. ובאמת
הגדולים יודעים לשנות את דעתם אבל הקטנים אין

* (הג"ה) ונמן דוגמה ממה שכתב בספר קובץ
הערות נגד הקמת מדינה. והגמוני צלה"ה
התנגד בכל תוקף להקמת המדינה כי אמר שחרוץ
מלחמה ויירגו יהודים, ואולם אורי קמטה נלחם
באליה שהפיגנו נגדה בפני הגרויים ומאotta סבה שאם
היהודים לא יתמכנו במדינה שוב תפוץ מלחמה ויירגו
יהודים, והמשתדל לטפות בידי ישראל עכ"ל עיין חשיבות
מוסר גמור ורודף כל ישראל עכ"ל עיין חשיבות
אייברא סימן ק"ז וק"ט.

"LISTENING TO GOD"
R. SHLOMO RISKIN

Chapter Forty-Nine

The Miracle of the Soviet Jewry Movement

One of the great miracles of the twentieth century was the exodus of Soviet Jewry from behind the Iron Curtain; more than one million of them came to Israel. I was privileged to take part in the Soviet Jewry movement from its very beginnings in the early 1960s, and it was one of the defining experiences of my life.

There were at least three million Jews behind the Iron Curtain at that time, Jews whom Elie Wiesel had called "The Jews of Silence" because their own ability to speak out was repressed by the Communist totalitarian Soviet government, and there was no voice of world Jewry speaking out on their behalf.

→ In the early sixties I had met a fascinating Englishman named Jacob Birnbaum, a Herzlian figure with fire in his eyes and passion in his heart. His grandfather was the very famous Nathan Birnbaum, a leading *ba'al teshuva* intellectual who coined the word "Zionism."

Jacob Birnbaum had just returned from a fact-finding mission to the Soviet Union, which he had undertaken in disguise. He was highly charged with the necessity of activist work on behalf of Soviet Jews.



He envisioned world-wide demonstrations that would force the Soviet regime to either let its Jews live as Jews where they were, or leave as Jews for Israel.

The religious establishment at that time was against activist tactics; they felt it best to work through quiet diplomacy. A number of important rabbinic figures, most notably Rav Pinhas Teitz, were then visiting the Soviet Union regularly, and managing to bring in matzot for Pesah, *shofarot* for Rosh HaShana, and basic prayer-books for the few remaining functioning synagogues. It was believed that any activist demonstrations would endanger what they were now succeeding in doing in conjunction with the Communist authorities.

But I felt we had to learn from the mistakes we had made at the time of the Holocaust and take the offensive with public demonstrations against Soviet anti-Semitism. I believed that Jacob was right.

I went to consult with my rebbe, Rav Soloveitchik, about the advisability of this activist approach on behalf of Soviet Jews, and the Rav responded in a way that has crucially affected my whole philosophy of halakha. "I don't understand why you are asking me," he said. "You have to ask a top Sovietologist." He impressed upon me that when one is dealing with issues that are not necessarily halakhic issues discussed by the rabbis in the Talmud and the *Rishonim*, but are issues that have to do with historical and sociological trends and ramifications, one must go to the experts in those fields. I met with Professor Goldhagen, a leading Sovietologist of the day who taught at Harvard University, and when I reported back on the result of my research, the Rav gave his blessing for activist demonstrations.

At that time there were no national organizations for Soviet Jewry.

The Jewish Agency gave small allocations to regular organizations, like Hadassah, for some Soviet Jewry activities, but there was no organization solely dedicated to being the voice of the three million plus Jews behind the Iron Curtain. And since each of these organizations zealously protected the funds that they received for their small Soviet Jewry departments, the established secular organizations also stood up against us.

Lincoln Square Synagogue was in its infancy, but it nevertheless became an important base for the burgeoning Soviet Jewry movement. Frieda Bluestone, soon to become Jacobs's dedicated wife, and a very

intelligent and active woman in her own right, was a devoted student in all of my classes, as was Glenn Richter, a crucial sparkplug for the entire movement.

First we founded the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry, of which I was chairman, and then we began the more adult Center for Russian Jewry, of which I was president. (Rav Avi Weiss succeeded me.) The leader – "prophet" – of the movement was, of course, Yaakov (Jacob) Birnbaum, his right hand was Glenn and, together, they deserve the lion's share of the credit for our subsequent victory. I must add that Rav Shlomo Carlebach provided the much needed musical expression for our rallies (*Od Avnu Hai, Kakhol VeLavan*, etc.), as he did for the newly burgeoning *ba'al teshuva* movement; indeed it is difficult to imagine these two major activities – even defining expressions of the Jewish youth of the 1960s and '70s – without Shlomo Carlebach's music, which gave our words and goals soulful expression.

In the beginning, we were seen as young, maverick upstarts working against the establishment. Our demonstrations in front of the United Nations and the Russian embassy were small initially, as few as fifteen or twenty people. (For the record, all of this happened *before* Rav Meir Kahane got actively involved. He certainly was a leading activist, but his demonstrations, unlike ours, generally ended in violence.) But eventually we pulled off a rally of a hundred thousand people, and we certainly did succeed in bringing the issue of Soviet Jewry to the forefront of American Jewish consciousness. Even more importantly, with God's help, we succeeded in piercing through the Iron Curtain and enabling one million Jews to emigrate to Israel, America, Germany and elsewhere. The process itself – activist demonstrations and visits behind the Iron Curtain to give moral support to the refuseniks and even help to relieve their suffering – defined Lincoln Square Synagogue's mission and gave social-concern direction to a burgeoning Modern Orthodoxy; our success made me truly believe that "if you will it, it is not a dream," and that "if one goes to purify, he is helped from above."

"REBBE"

R' JOSEPH TELUSHKIN

Chapter 20



SOVIET JEWRY

Public Demonstrations Will Hurt Russian Jews

"THE KEY IS QUIET DIPLOMACY."

Two of the hottest political issues in the American Jewish community in the late 1960s and 1970s was how best to pressure the Soviet Union to allow Soviet Jews to leave Russia and how to combat the Soviet Union's anti-Semitic policies, which made it difficult and dangerous for Russian Jews, young Jews in particular, to practice or study Judaism. Groups such as SSSJ (the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry), the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, the Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry, and the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews advocated and organized large public demonstrations directed against the Soviet government and its leadership. On the other side, the Rebbe, whom it was known maintained an active educational underground in the Soviet Union, publicly opposed such demonstrations, arguing that they caused harm to Russian Jews, leading to harassment and even imprisonment of committed Jews. He stated that, based on his knowledge, the demonstrations were anything but helpful for the plight of Soviet Jewry, and he advocated behind-the-scenes "quiet diplomacy" as the most effective tool to help Russia's Jews.

At a February 1971 farbrengen, the Rebbe devoted two of his talks, which lasted about an hour and a half, to expressing, in the strongest language he had used until that time, his opposition to demonstrations on behalf of Russian Jews. Several times during the talks that evening,

the Rebbe challenged those who disagreed with this position with great emotion and pathos: "Tell the truth. Can they show that the demonstrations have led to even one Jew being allowed to leave the Soviet Union?" He referred several times to an incident that had happened some time earlier. A large group of Jews, some hundred families, had been scheduled to be allowed to leave Russia. To ensure that their visas not be canceled, the Rebbe had pleaded that a large demonstration planned for just before Passover be called off or at least postponed. The Rebbe did not name the person to whom he had directed his plea but emphasized that he had personally met with an individual who had the power to have such a rally canceled, and he urged that, at the very least, it be postponed until just before Shavuot, which falls almost two months after Passover, and by which time the families would have been allowed to leave. But the party to whom the Rebbe conveyed his urgent message refused his request and, indeed, the families who had been scheduled to be released were still languishing inside Russia, as a result, he believed, of the demonstrations.

(2) The Rebbe's support for "quiet diplomacy" and opposition to public demonstrations for Soviet Jewry had long been known, but it was never expressed in public with such specific arguments and details.

Even after the *farbengen*, one thing that still remained unknown was with whom the Rebbe had been in touch. Who was the person who had the power to cancel a demonstration supported by a large variety of American Jewish organizations? And with what arguments did the person respond to the Rebbe's arguments and appeals? No more details were forthcoming from the Rebbe at the *farbengen* or later.

Some years after this talk, Nehemiah Levanon, an Israeli who had worked at the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC, wrote his memoirs (*Code Name: Nativ*; the book is in Hebrew), in which he included a chapter about the Rebbe. Levanon, whose background was in Israeli intelligence, had long worked on behalf of the Israeli government. One of his major responsibilities was coordinating activities in the West on behalf of Russian Jewry, part of Israel's campaign to get the Jews out of the Soviet Union and bring them to Israel. While American Jews involved in the Soviet Jewish movement assumed that Levanon was an Israeli diplomat

in charge of the Soviet desk in Washington, in fact he was an agent in the Mossad, Israel's national intelligence agency, who reported directly to the leadership of the Mossad and to Prime Minister Golda Meir. We know now from his account that he was the person to whom the Rebbe turned in his effort to call off this demonstration.

Levanon writes of the Rebbe with great respect, but he also recalls the sharp argument the two men had over the Rebbe's insistence that demonstrations were harmful to Russian Jews. The meeting ended with Levanon refusing to adhere to the Rebbe's request to cause the demonstration to be canceled, though he did promise to pass on the Rebbe's request to his superiors in Jerusalem.

One might have thought that Levanon's refusal of the Rebbe's request would have led, at the least, to a decided tension in the two men's relationship, and perhaps to a rupture. But such was not the case (significantly, and characteristically, when the Rebbe alluded to his meeting with Levanon at the *farbengen*, he said of him, "He is a fine Jew"). Some months later, the Rebbe had Rabbi Hodakov, his chief of staff, invite Rabbi Shlomo Riskin to meet with him. Riskin had previously met with the Rebbe on a number of occasions, but this was their only meeting, Riskin recalls, initiated at the Rebbe's request. Though Riskin was among the founders of the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry, the most widely known of the American groups organizing protest rallies on behalf of Russian Jews, the Rebbe did not try to dissuade him from engaging in such activities. This is in itself surprising given that Riskin made no secret of his great admiration for the Rebbe, a man whom he regarded as *manhig ha-dor*, the leader of the generation. One can assume that such an appeal by the Rebbe would have at least been seriously considered by Riskin. But this was not why the Rebbe had summoned him. Rather, it was to ask Riskin if he would be willing to undertake a secret mission on his behalf, to help organize four underground yeshivot in the Soviet Union. Riskin immediately assented. Then, to his amazement—Riskin later recounted that he felt as if he were in a scene from a James Bond film—the Rebbe opened up a drawer in his desk and pulled out a telephone. He dialed, and when the phone was answered, the Rebbe said, "Nehemiah, Riskin *maskim*" ("Nehemiah, Riskin agrees").

The Rebbe then handed the phone over to Riskin, who a few seconds later found himself speaking to Nehemiah Levanon, the very man who rejected the Rebbe's insistent request to help cancel or postpone the demonstration.

Levanon asked Riskin if he would also be willing to help set up underground *ulpanim*, classes in Hebrew (the study of Hebrew outside of government supervision was also forbidden in the Soviet Union) while on his trip to the Soviet Union, and Riskin agreed to do so as well.

The Rebbe's willingness to direct Riskin to Levanon suggests as well his strategic ability to always keep in mind the big picture. There were ways, he recognized, in which Levanon and Riskin—whom he felt were wrong, even dangerously misguided on the issue of demonstrations—could nonetheless help Russian Jews in other areas.

After leaving the Rebbe's office, Riskin found himself entrusted to a handler, a man assigned to prepare him for his trip. Over the coming days, Riskin was given many names and addresses to learn by heart, and he was also given a pair of shoes with a false heel into which wads of money had been inserted. Riskin was instructed to go to the Leningrad (today St. Petersburg) *mikveh* and to leave the shoes in the changing room when he went inside to immerse himself. When Riskin returned from the *mikveh*, the money had been withdrawn. It was used, Riskin learned, to provide basic necessities for observant Jews in Leningrad who had lost their jobs and had become unemployable because of their refusal to work on Shabbat.

This story of Riskin at the Leningrad *mikveh* reflects the depth of the Rebbe's connections inside Russia. How did the person who opened the heel of Riskin's shoe (who had earlier introduced himself to Riskin as Michael) know that an American Jew would be arriving at the *mikveh* on such and such a date and at such and such a time with money hidden in his shoes? This incident took place in the early 1970s, well before the advent of cell phones and personal computers. How was such information transmitted? To this day, Riskin does not know, but what he does recall is that "Wherever I went [in the Soviet Union], they knew that I was coming; true in Moscow, true in Leningrad, true in Riga, and true in Vilna."

There is, I believe, another dimension to the Rebbe's repeated, and decidedly vehement, opposition to demonstrations on behalf of Russian Jews. The Rebbe, based on information and impressions gleaned from personal contacts—and as he made clear to all those with whom he discussed this issue—had an insider's knowledge of the Soviet leadership and of what they were capable. He also knew that the Russian leadership was very familiar with who he was and that the contents of his public speeches would become known to Soviet authorities. If the Rebbe supported anti-Soviet demonstrations in his speeches, Jews in Russia might well suffer, and I suspect (and this is my personal belief and not based on the Rebbe's public pronouncements) he also feared that the Russians might well wreak revenge against his followers in particular. Behind the scenes, the Rebbe was willing to work with pro-demonstration groups; such activities would not become known to the Soviets. But his sense of obligation to the Jews in Russia precluded him from going public with his criticism of the government.

What was the source of the Rebbe's fear of what the Soviets might do to the Jews under their governance? The young Menachem Mendel Schneerson was a teenager in Yekaterinoslav (now Dnepropetrovsk) when the Communists took control in Russia, and he was well aware from his own and his family's experiences of the depth of their ruthlessness and hatred of religion, Judaism in particular (see pages 000–000); his father had resisted the Communists and they eventually jailed him and then exiled him to a remote town in Kazakhstan where he suffered terribly (see page 000). That was decades earlier, but from the ongoing meetings the Rebbe held with people who either had lived in or visited the Soviet Union, he knew that the anti-Semitism had continued. He also knew of the intricate spy systems that the Communists had introduced and still maintained, in which informers were inserted into every organization. Or almost every. The late Yaakov Herzog, director of the prime minister's office in Israel, reported that an American State Department official had once told him that the Soviets had succeeded in infiltrating informers into every religious and political group in Russia, with the exception of "some Jewish sect headquartered and headed by a rabbi in Brooklyn."

Aware, therefore, of how carefully the Soviets tracked all information and details about their society, it appears to me likely that the Rebbe assumed that when he spoke against anti-Soviet demonstrations, and against engaging in any activities intended to publicly pressure and embarrass the Russians, he knew that his words would reach well beyond the thousand or more people present at the *farbreng*. Most obviously, his opposition would become known in the broader Jewish community. But what likely mattered even more to the Rebbe was that it would become known to the Soviet government.

The Rebbe wished, it appears, for the Russian government to know that any demonstrations were in express opposition to his will, and that therefore the government should take no punitive actions against those whom they might otherwise target for harassment. The Rebbe did not want Jews in Russia blamed for provoking anti-Soviet demonstrations, and he wanted to protect all Russian Jews, including his followers, from such accusations.

Significantly, though, his commitment to helping all Russian Jews accounts as well for his willingness to work with people who did support demonstrations. His opposition to demonstrations was public; his cooperation with such people was private. He tried, when he felt he could, to halt or postpone anti-Soviet demonstrations.¹ On one occasion, when the Rebbe realized that he was not going to succeed in getting a demonstration canceled, he told Rabbi Israel Miller, president of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and an active proponent of protest demonstrations, “If you’re going ahead with the demonstration, make sure it gets onto the front page of the *New York Times*.² Equally important, he tried to work behind the scenes with groups supporting demonstrations in areas in which the lives of Russian Jews could be helped. The Mossad, it is known, helped Chabad bring into Russia religious materials such as Jewish calendars and Jewish religious texts. This was done as well by the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry, many of whose members went on missions to meet with dissident Jews inside Russia. Glenn Richter, the longtime number two person at SSSJ, told me that they “worked a great deal with Chabad in getting their material into the USSR.” One of those who supported

demonstrations and who stayed in ongoing touch with the Rebbe was Malcolm Hoenlein, the founding executive director of the Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry, and the chairman, since 1986, of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.

The Rebbe’s commitment to promoting Jewish identity inside Russia was so deep that he was happy to encourage the reading of books of which he would normally disapprove. At a meeting with Israel Singer of the World Jewish Congress, he asked Singer what kinds of books Jews inside the Soviet Union were reading. Singer mentioned Leon Uris’s novel *Exodus*. An international bestseller published in 1959, *Exodus* presented in the form of historical fiction the story of how the State of Israel came into being. The narrative mixed in prominent historical figures along with fictional characters, and impassioned love stories against the background of historical events. *Exodus* was an avowedly secular, pro-Zionist work; religion played little role in the book. Yet when Singer informed the Rebbe of how profoundly significant this work was in promoting Jewish pride among Soviet Jews (it played a similar role in the United States as well),³ the Rebbe was excited. Singer told the Rebbe of one man who informed him that he had been the four hundredth reader of a copy of the book, which had been brought in by an American couple who had visited Russia. The Rebbe told Singer, “We must get more such copies of the book into the country.” As Singer recalls: “He didn’t tell me only to bring in siddurim [prayer books]; he didn’t tell me only to bring in *Chumashim* [the Torah], he told me if this strengthens people, then we have to bring more of this book, that that is a good thing.”³

It is hard to think of other Chasidic Rebbes who would have encouraged the reading of the novel *Exodus*.

Despite all the barriers erected by the Soviet government, the Rebbe always maintained a connection with the Jews behind the Iron Curtain, both through clandestine contact with Chasidim, and also with others—sometimes far removed from the world of Chasidus—who had occasion to be in Russia and to be in communication with the Jews there. Thus, Aryeh ‘Lova’ Eliav was a left-of-center Israeli politician and member of the Knesset. From 1958 until 1960, he served as the first secretary of the Israeli consulate in Moscow, and in 1965 became Israel’s

deputy minister of immigrant absorption. That year, Eliav, who had just published his account of Russian-Jewish life, *Between Hammer and Sickle*, visited New York and asked to meet the Rebbe. As he later recalled: "I was interested to meet him, and I knew he was also interested to meet me. Who could have known as much as I did of the work that Chabad was doing in Russia—we in the consulate may have not known everything, but we did know of the Rebbe's clandestine work in the Soviet Union."⁴

Eliav has many recollections of his *yechidus*, extending from 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Pretty much the entire seven hours were devoted to a discussion of Jewish life inside Russia. By the time the meeting ended, Eliav recalled, "I realized that the Rebbe knew much more about me and my work than I could have imagined." He described how the Rebbe "cross-examined" him while going to great lengths not to share any new information that Eliav himself didn't already know; the Rebbe was known to keep his own sources secret. Yet the range of his knowledge of day-to-day life inside Russia, a country the Rebbe had left in 1928, staggered Eliav: "I realized that I had no new secrets to share with him as he already knew [the basics of] everything that was happening there; what he wanted from me were details."

The Rebbe thrived on details, for it was through details, not general assessments, that he could most accurately determine the needs of Soviet Jews—and strive to fulfill them. To procure information and to provide help to Russia's Jews, he would dispatch people to visit the Soviet Union posing as tourists (this was later done as well by the Soviet Jewry protest organizations and by the Israeli government). In a 1957 letter, at a time when tourism to Russia was uncommon, we find him reminding a man who was making a return trip to bring with him, as he had done previously, Jewish books, "which you should leave at the synagogue."⁵ The Rebbe would also entrust visitors to Russia with extra pairs of tefillin and tell them to leave them behind with Jews who needed them. Though most Jews wear only one type of tefillin, the people sent in by Chabad practiced a variety of stratagems by which to bring in extra tefillin, for example, informing the officials examining their bags that all of the tefillin were for their personal use and that different types of tefillin were needed for different days of the week. When dealing with thieves

and with oppressors, Jewish law does not obligate one to be truthful. Professor Velvel Greene recalls Rabbi Shmuel Lew emptying out his wife's mascara case and filling it up with the special ink necessary for writing mezuzot and Torah scrolls. Nor was it just religious items that the Rebbe wanted people to bring in with them. That same year as well, the Rebbe asked a Chasid who was going to Russia to bring with him a variety of medications that could not be procured there.⁶

In 1971, during the heyday of the Communist regime, the journalist Gershon Jacobson, a Russian native, paid a weeklong visit there. He later told of how the Rebbe prepared him for his trip, advising him on the minutest details. Make up your bed in the morning, the Rebbe advised, particularly if it had become messy overnight. Otherwise, the maid who cleans your room will report to an official that you had slept very fitfully, and this indication of your nervousness might ignite suspicion against you and cause you to be carefully shadowed.⁷

The Rebbe also asked Jacobson to be in touch with him as soon as he came back. The *yechidus* they had lasted from eleven at night till six in the morning. The first thing Jacobson did upon entering the Rebbe's office was to give him handwritten letters that Jews had entrusted him to bring to the Rebbe. He handed the Rebbe the whole pile, some 150 letters. Though all were intended for Menachem Mendel Schneerson, none of them addressed him as Rebbe or used his name; it would have been dangerous for the Russian Jews to do so, in case the letters were confiscated by Soviet authorities. Instead they wrote, *Tire zeyde* (Dear grandfather) or *Tire fater* (Dear uncle). When the Rebbe would respond to these letters, he did so through emissaries who would hand deliver them; he would sign his letters as *Zeyde Mendel* (Grandfather Mendel), and sometimes *dyedushka* (the Russian word for "grandfather").

Now, as the Rebbe took the letters, he handled them very gently, "cradling them like children," Jacobson recalled, and opened a few and started reading. The Rebbe started crying intensely, and Jacobson, embarrassed to be witnessing so intimate a scene, started to edge himself out of the room. With a hand gesture, the Rebbe signaled him to stay and then proceeded to spend the rest of the night grilling Jacobson on every aspect of his trip. As was the case with Eliav, what the Rebbe was

in search of was details, the details that would enable him and Chabad to help, in the most concrete manner possible, more Jews, often one by one by one.

Professor Velvel Greene was dispatched by the Rebbe to Russia in 1981 with a decidedly limited agenda. The Rebbe wanted Greene to meet with three scientists, two in Moscow, one in Leningrad, who, the Rebbe had learned, "were prepared to become more religiously observant, but who were stymied in their advancement by one problem, the so-called contradiction between science and Torah." The Rebbe asked Greene, a distinguished scientist at the University of Minnesota, to go to Russia, meet with these men, and show them that there is no contradiction between being a scientist and following the Torah. Greene did so, though, to his frustration, one of the men was unavailable during his visit. Today, all three of the scientists live in Israel and lead religiously observant lives. Till the end of his life, Greene remained staggered by this whole incident, that the Rebbe, residing in Brooklyn, reached out to him in Minnesota, because he was worried about three professors in Russia who needed help to advance in their Jewish commitments.⁸

(15)

Today, several decades since the Soviet Jewry movement, it seems clear that there were gains achieved both by behind-the-scenes quiet diplomatic efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews, and by public pressuring and demonstrations as well. The Rebbe identified with those who urged "quiet diplomacy" and in doing so was able to play an important, sometimes crucial, role—far greater than is generally known—in influencing the release of large numbers of Jews.

The late Republican senator from Nevada, Jacob Hecht, universally known by his nickname, "Chic," was elected in 1982. Two years later, he was taken by his brother Martin and nephew Chaim to meet the Rebbe at a *farbrengung*. During their brief encounter, Hecht told the Rebbe of how his own mother had fled Russia decades earlier to escape death at the hands of the Cossacks. The Rebbe, in turn, told Hecht: "Your top priority [in addition, presumably, to his other senatorial responsibilities] should be to get the Jews out of Russia. . . . The key," he added, "is quiet diplomacy."

A short time later, Hecht was able to supply a crucial vote on a bill that mattered greatly to President Ronald Reagan. When Reagan expressed gratitude to Hecht for his support, the senator asked if he might bring up a concern of his. After spending a moment or two telling the president how his mother had succeeded in getting out of Russia so many years earlier, and that it was only by the grace of God that he himself was now standing on the floor of the U.S. Senate, he asked the president to place increased emphasis on the release of tens of thousands of Russian Jews at the upcoming Reykjavik, Iceland, summit conference with Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev: "Those who are allowed to leave the Soviet Union, Mr. President, should not be just elderly, but children, teenagers, doctors, and scientists. All should be allowed the basic human right of freedom." The president, in turn, expressed his concern for Soviet Jews and his desire to aid Hecht and the Jewish community in this objective.

A short time later, Hecht found himself to be the president's final appointment before his departure to Iceland. He presented Reagan with a list of twelve hundred Soviet Jews who had applied to emigrate from Russia but had been unable to procure visas, and he expressed the hope that getting these people out would be a start, and would eventually culminate in many more Jews being permitted to leave. At the conference, Reagan gave the list of twelve hundred names to Gorbachev and emphasized how important this issue was to him. Within a few weeks, people on the list started to be released, and by the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the number of Russian Jews allowed to leave swelled into the hundreds of thousands.⁹

Some years later, after Reagan left office and Hecht had been appointed ambassador to the Bahamas, the former president and his wife went there to vacation, and they invited Ambassador and Mrs. Hecht to a cocktail reception. Hecht offered his thanks to the president for helping to get Jews out of the Soviet Union and asked why he had never mentioned the act in public (particularly as it might have marshaled support for him in the Jewish community, which is largely Democratic). Mrs. Reagan told Hecht that when the president had made his plea to let the Jews on this list leave, Gorbachev told him that there were many people around him in the Kremlin leadership who did not want to let

the Jews emigrate, and if Reagan publicized Gorbachev's concession, the exodus would stop. And so, Mrs. Reagan now said, President Reagan needed to use "quiet diplomacy" with Gorbachev.

"Quiet diplomacy," Hecht later recalled, were the very words the Rebbe had earlier addressed to him.¹⁰

Writing in 2004 of his involvement both with the Rebbe and with President Reagan, Senator Hecht, who died in 2006, referred to his work in helping get Jews out of Russia, "*as the most important story of my life. It is the story of the wisdom of the Rebbe*" (emphasis added).¹¹

President Reagan himself epitomized the two sides of the conflict over how to deal with the Soviet Union, employing "quiet diplomacy," when he deemed it appropriate, and a far more confrontational approach when he thought that it was needed. Indeed, in the same month in which Reagan employed a somewhat conciliatory approach with Russian ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin (see note 000), he also referred to the Soviet Union, in a widely cited speech, as the "evil empire."

Natan Sharansky, the best known of the Soviet Jewish dissidents, and a man long committed to public demonstrations on behalf of Soviet Jews (he himself served nine years in Soviet prisons and credits demonstrations in the West with helping get him released), has written of a meeting he had with Reagan at the White House in September 1987. Reagan was scheduled to have a summit meeting a few months later with Gorbachev, and Sharansky asked the president what he thought of the idea of having a massive rally of several hundred thousand people on behalf of Soviet Jews during the summit. Sharansky was seeking the president's approval because "some Jewish leaders, concerned that if the rally were held, Jews would be accused of undermining a renewed hope for peace between the superpowers, had expressed reservations about such a frontal challenge to the new Soviet leader." Reagan's response was immediate: "Do you think I am interested in a friendship with the Soviets if they continue to keep their people in? You do what you believe is right."¹²

The Rebbe's dispute with the pro-demonstration activists in the United States did not derive from a differing assessment between the two sides

on the nature of the Soviet Union. Both sides were in full agreement on the evil and anti-Semitic nature of the regime. The issue that divided them was what would be the most effective way to secure freedom for the Jews—public confrontations with the Soviets or behind-the-scenes diplomacy—or perhaps, as seems most probable, the pursuit of both, having different people doing different things, the Rebbe in effect being the "good cop" and the demonstrators the "bad cop."

The Rebbe therefore cultivated a public strategy (never to publicly antagonize the Soviet Union) and a private strategy (to find areas in which he could cooperate even with those who opposed his public strategy). His goals, though, remained constant: to get Jews out of Russia and to create an environment in which those Jews who remained could lead Jewish lives. Opposing demonstrations and opposing legislation directed against the Soviet Union (such as the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which blocked trade benefits to the Russians unless they allowed free emigration) could deflect Soviet antagonism away from Jews inside Russia. But despite his public pronouncements, at a private meeting with New York senator Patrick Moynihan the Rebbe could make it clear that he would be very happy to see Jackson-Vanik passed, or at least to have it used as a bargaining chip with the Russians in exchange for serious Soviet concessions.¹³

Open Secret: Chabad and Its Work for Jews Inside the Soviet Union

When Menachem Mendel Schneerson assumed the leadership of Chabad in 1951, the Soviet Union was ruled by the totalitarian antisemite Josef Stalin, and the future of its Jewish community was bleak. It soon seemed bleaker. In 1953, Stalin started making preparations to exile the country's entire Jewish community, over three million in number, to Siberia. Like the biblical villain Haman, Stalin died shortly before he could carry out his plot. Nevertheless, during the

Rabbi Teitz Differs with Conference on Soviet Jewry on Simhat Torah Demonstrations

[DOWNLOAD PDF FOR THIS DATE](#)October 11, 1968

NEW YORK (Oct. 10)

An Orthodox rabbinical friend of Rabbi Yehuda Leib Levin of Moscow disclosed today that the latter wrote to him requesting him to send a large quantity of religious and ritual items for use in Moscow's Choral Synagogue. Rabbi Pinchas Teitz, of Elizabeth, N.J., a member of the presidium of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada, said that the request from Rabbi Levin is a "symptom" of the "beginning" of a closer relationship between Soviet and American Jewry — one to which the Soviet Government lends its approval.

Rabbi Teitz's view of developing relations has involved him in a dispute with the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, an "umbrella" body whose membership consists of 25 major American Jewish organizations representing virtually every facet of this country's Jewish community. Rabbi Teitz approached Rabbi Israel Miller, outgoing chairman of the Conference, to register his personal opposition and, he claims, the opposition of others to the Simhat Torah demonstrations of solidarity with Russian Jewry which the Conference has planned in 27 cities in the U.S. and Canada. Rabbi Teitz argued that the demonstrations could cause the Soviet Government to consider Simhat Torah gatherings by Russian Jewish youth as a show of solidarity with the American groups. On that basis, he maintained, the Kremlin could "nullify such gatherings, thereby denying Soviet Jews the opportunity to express their Jewish identity."

Rabbi Teitz said he had been in close contact with Rabbi Levin since the latter's return to Moscow from a visit to the U.S. last spring and that there had been several signs of a "warming up" of official treatment of Jews. He cited the "warmth" which, he said, a rabbinical mission to Russia headed by Rabbi Wolfe Kelman found in official circles last summer. Rabbi Kelman is executive vice president of the Rabbinical Assembly of America, the organization of Conservative rabbis.



Rabbi Miller disagreed with Rabbi Teitz's thesis. He said that "If the Soviet Government wants to build bridges they will do so whether or not demonstrations of solidarity will be held." He cited developments in Russia since Rabbi Levin's American visit last summer which, he said, "blotted out" the hopes raised that Russian Jews might be accorded a measure of the rights and freedoms enjoyed by other minorities in the Soviet Union. The Conference has asked the sponsors of the Oct. 13 demonstrations to emphasize their religious character and omit any political motifs.

served to sharpen the internal boundaries between Modern Orthodoxy and its traditionalist Orthodox counterparts.⁸⁶

American Orthodoxy and Soviet Jewry Activism— The Internal Divide

The Lubavitcher (Chabad) Hasidic sect, as pointed out above, had long maintained a network of emissaries within the Soviet Union that sought to preserve some semblance of religious life.⁸⁷ In addition, Rabbi Pinchas Teitz (1908–1995) of Elizabeth, New Jersey, who was in close contact with both the traditionalist rabbinic elite and Yeshiva University Modern Orthodox circles, had been making efforts since the 1950s to maintain a connection with Soviet Jewry. From 1965, he traveled regularly to the Soviet Union, teaching classes to local Jews and distributing Jewish religious books. He also cultivated relationships with Russian officials—an issue that was subsequently criticized severely by the activists.⁸⁸

Both the Lubavitcher Rebbe—Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson (1902–2004)—and Teitz, however, were vehemently opposed to public protest of the plight of Soviet Jewry, which they considered highly counterproductive. They claimed it would very well endanger the physical welfare of more than three million Jews. No doubt they were also convinced that it would compromise their own rapport with the Soviet government as well as their clandestine efforts at sustaining religious life. Schneerson expressed his sharp opposition to mass protests in a major address from 1971: "May the one who sits upon high protect Russian Jewry from those who cause disruptions in order to supposedly help them, but whose hearts are oblivious to what constitutes real help and what causes the opposite effect. . . . It is imperative, instead, to advance secret initiatives like those that until now have brought substantive results."⁸⁹

Regarding Rabbi Teitz's ongoing attempts to influence YU figures to oppose public demonstration, Jacob Birnbaum comments that "R. Pinchas Teitz was a thorn in our side for many years."⁹⁰ By contrast, despite their tactical differences with Schneerson, in interviews with Soviet Jewry activists, they uniformly express admiration for his movement's extensive efforts to sustain Judaism in the Soviet Union throughout the twentieth century. In fact, according to Richter, the SSSJ worked for years in coordination with Chabad to send religious materials to Jews in the Soviet Union. Malcolm Hoenlein also comments that he had no criticism of Chabad since "they had the most to lose." Moreover, he describes having numerous meetings with Rabbi Schneerson in which "he was laser sharp and never tried

to convince me to change my approach." When Rabbi Shlomo "Steven" Riskin was set to travel to the Soviet Union in 1970, Rabbi Schneerson invited the then chairman of the SSSJ to a private meeting (*yehidus*). There he gave him contact numbers for local Russian Jews and asked that, during his visit, he try to set up underground yeshivas in four cities.⁹¹ Yet upon Rabbi Israel Miller's return from a 1965 trip to the Soviet Union, the Lubavitcher Rebbe asked to meet him privately at his Brooklyn headquarters. Schneerson was extremely interested in every detail regarding his journey, but he strongly discouraged Miller from any public activity against the Russians and also urged him to grow a beard.⁹²

The extreme anti-activist position articulated by Schneerson and Teitz came to characterize the majority of the leaders of the traditionalist Orthodox camp in America.⁹³ There were certainly exceptions to this rule, most notably when Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, the preeminent American religio-legal authority, sent a message of support that was read publicly by his son-in-law Rabbi Moses Tendler at a 1968 rally.⁹⁴ There were also some indications of grassroots pressure within the traditionalist world to adopt a more activist position, which even produced a modicum of flexibility. During the crisis that ensued in 1970–1971 in light of the Leningrad Trials, the leaders of Agudath Israel took pains to publicize an "all-day meeting of the Moetzes Gedolei HaTorah [Council of Torah Sages] where they had reviewed their position and consulted with 'reliable experts'."⁹⁵ Yet their conclusion was that "representations to alleviate the plight of Russian Jewry which are aggressive and provocative can only harm and aggravate the situation. Accordingly, they are not participating in the general demonstrations since they are not able to control the tone or character of these gatherings."⁹⁶ As such, they sponsored a prayer "gathering" in the Manhattan Center on January 10, 1971, at which the press reported an attendance of 13,000 people (5,000 inside the building and 8,000 on the street), and they encouraged affiliated institutions outside New York to follow suit.⁹⁷ They also asked their members to send "appeal telegrams" to the Russian Ambassador in Washington, "beseeching the Russian government for passion and clemency for those convicted in the Leningrad trials."⁹⁸ Intent on making sure that no one should interpret the New York non-rally as a public protest, the official Agudah spokesman announced that "there was no cry of 'Never Again'" and "when someone at one point shouted 'Am Yisrael Chai' [the people of Israel live], he was simply ignored and it did not even cause a ripple."⁹⁹

Despite such reservations, these events suggest that, at least at one crucial juncture in the history of the American Soviet Jewry movement, traditionalist Orthodoxy manifested behavior that bears

similarities to the burgeoning activist strategy. Unlike non-Orthodox American Jews, however, who, by the mid-1970s, were coming out in droves to the large rallies, the ranks of yeshiva students and young Hasidim that were beginning to swell at the time never became a visible presence at public demonstrations for Soviet Jewry. Ultimately, the one aspect of the Soviet Jewry movement that Agudath Israel did unequivocally embrace was sending clandestine delegations to refuseniks in the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁰

American traditionalist Orthodoxy's preference for working behind the scenes and its aversion to public demonstrations have been explained as a reflection of this sector's unwillingness to deviate from the *shtadlanus* (intercession) approach that characterized Jewish-Gentile political relations throughout the European diaspora. Jewish communities traditionally appointed diplomats of sorts whose task was to negotiate communal interests with the local powers. Excluded from mainstream political life and fearful that drawing greater attention could only spell trouble, they cultivated personal connections with members of the court. At times, these *shtadlanim* had to agree to heavy additional financial burdens that would be shared by the entire Jewish collective in return for what was only to be a temporary respite from danger. Particularly since the rise of modern Zionism, the term *shtadlanus* has acquired a pejorative connotation in many circles.¹⁰¹

The "*shtadlanus* instinct" offers a partial explanation for the traditionalist Orthodox aversion to public protest. Nevertheless, I would like to raise an additional avenue of thought that takes greater account of the specific historical circumstances of mid-twentieth century American Jewry. This approach, in turn, will also shed light on the question of why Soviet Jewry activism had particular appeal to a considerable number of young, American Modern Orthodox Jews in the mid-1960s.

There appear to be both geographical and generational factors at work in the debate between public activism and behind-the-scenes diplomacy that simmered within American Orthodoxy. Schneerson and Teitz, as well as almost all of the major Orthodox rabbinical authorities of the 1960s and 1970s, were Eastern European born.¹⁰² The majority had experienced personally the destructive force of totalitarian Communism prior to emigration, and many had been refugees who arrived in America concurrent with the spread of Nazi rule in Europe. This background was evidenced both in their continued approach to the Soviet Union as well as in their relationship to the United States.

Their fear of Communism was limitless and the thought of Jews actually standing up and challenging the Kremlin beyond comprehension. In describing the difficulties he encountered in

presenting the merits of the protest movement to Rabbi Feinstein, Malcolm Hoenlein explained ironically, "One could not convince him that Hitler was worse than Stalin, because he had lived under Stalin."¹⁰³ Glenn Richter added similarly, about Rabbi Schneerson, "The Rebbe's concerns regarding public protest were based on his personal experiences living under Communist rule."¹⁰⁴ Indeed, in criticizing the relatively passive custom adopted by Soviet Jewry activists of leaving a seat open at the Passover Seder to signify a Soviet Jew who was denied emigration, Schneerson commented: "The Sages said 'do not agitate a young (small) gentile' (*Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot* 111a). Seemingly they should have said 'do not agitate a mature (big) gentile?' The message seems to be clear, then, that if you should refrain from agitating a young gentile, certainly do not do so to a mature one. Yet in our days they have chosen to agitate the mature gentile."¹⁰⁵

These immigrant rabbis had found security and a new beginning on American soil. Despite their fears of acculturating American freedom and materialism, they were highly appreciative of what the country had done for them and their followers. For many, the idea of publicly protesting at a time when such behavior was becoming associated with the radical anti-Vietnam War movement was especially problematic.¹⁰⁶

Prior to the Vietnam era, one of the most vehement critics of Soviet Jewry demonstrations had actually joined a public protest in America for a different cause. On August 25, 1963, Rabbi Teitz spoke at a civil rights rally that took place at New York's Polo Grounds and encouraged Jews to join in the March on Washington that was scheduled for the following Wednesday.¹⁰⁷ Unlike some of his traditionalist Orthodox colleagues, then, apparently Teitz was sufficiently comfortable in America to take a public stand on controversial matters within the public sphere.¹⁰⁸ When it came to his brethren in the Soviet Union, however, the Latvian native and former Lithuanian yeshiva pupil could not imagine Jews acting with such brashness.

The same geographical and generational factors are instructive in addressing the unwillingness of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik (1903–1993)—YU's central authority during the 1960s—to articulate a forthright position regarding Soviet Jewry. By then, Soloveitchik had already established his reputation as the most prominent Orthodox ideologue in America to digress significantly from the traditionalist line in regard to secular learning and the merits of modern culture.¹⁰⁹ Had such a statement been forthcoming from him, it would likely have marginalized the influence of Rabbi Teitz upon the YU faculty and student body. Yet when Soloveitchik's rabbinical pupils approached him in the

mid-1960s, he suggested that they refrain from public demonstrations—although he allowed that they should consult experts on the subject. According to some accounts, in private conversations, he later expressed regret for not supporting the protest movement.¹¹⁰ In addition, as mentioned above, his son-in-law and close disciple Aharon Lichtenstein was on the SSSJ board and attended a number of rallies during the mid-1960s. Nonetheless, even in the 1970s and 1980s, when Soviet Jewry activism became widely accepted by mainstream American Jewry, Rabbi Soloveitchik never came out publicly as a supporter of public demonstrations.¹¹¹ Certainly, the suggestion that his students consult with experts reflects his reticence about invoking the ultra-authoritative approach known as *da'as Torah* prevalent among the traditionalists.¹¹² Yet it would appear that, like his Eastern European-raised Agudath Israel counterparts, he, too, perceived the evil of Communist Russia in a way that differed from his predominantly American-born students. This would explain Rabbi Soloveitchik's own reluctance to confront the Soviet Union publicly, as well as his desire to consider the opinions of Sovietologists regarding the dangers that activism might engender for the local Jewish community.¹¹³ It is notable that his brother, Rabbi Ahron Soloveitchik (1917–2001), did take an open stand in favor of public activism in regard to Soviet Jewry, civil rights, and the Vietnam War. While the younger Soloveitchik was also born in Eastern Europe, he arrived in the United States as a teenager with his parents and received an American high school, college, and law school education.¹¹⁴

Contrary to the immigrant yeshiva heads and Hasidic leaders, the students and their fellow Orthodox Soviet Jewry activists had grown up in a completely different environment. Often the children of immigrants, almost all were American born and took their personal liberties for granted. Coming of age in the wake of the Holocaust and the rise of the early civil rights movement and its righteous "dream" of a better world, they, too, sought to engender a *tikkun olam* [repair the world]. This correction would address both the apathy of the previous generation and the contemporary imperative to spread the values of justice and freedom.¹¹⁵ Yet unlike their fellow non-Orthodox Jewish students, as Lora Rabin Dagi has demonstrated, for the most part, the Modern Orthodox students did not translate their sympathy with the civil rights movement into intense involvement.¹¹⁶ As Americanized as they were, they still emerged from Orthodox Jewish homes and schools where they had been brought up to concentrate on the particularistic and religious concerns of their people. They could appreciate and support the African American desire for equality, but their upbringing still made them gravitate more naturally to Jewish issues.¹¹⁷ As Glenn Richter puts it, "For most Jews, and Orthodox ones

in particular, active involvement in the civil rights movement was '*past nicht*' [unthinkable]. In those days, Jews simply didn't do those things, the very act of protest was a big *hiddush* [novelty]."¹¹⁸

Rabbi Irving "Yitz" Greenberg, the former vice-chairman of SSSJ and a prominent theologian and Holocaust scholar, refers to the Soviet Jewry movement as "our version of civil rights."¹¹⁹ It offered these young Modern Orthodox Americans a cause that enabled them to adopt the strategies and ethos of the peaceful civil rights movement without moving too far beyond their own natural, religious framework. Other than for the JDL fringe, it also had just enough of an antiestablishment ambiance to connect them with the broader cultural currents of the 1960s without demanding the radicalization that enveloped much of the antiwar movement and the more strident black power campaigns of the late 1960s.¹²⁰ Yet, it was anti-Soviet as well. Therefore, no matter how much pressure they put on the U.S. government to include the issue of Soviet Jewry within its diplomatic demands, no one could doubt that the Jews and America were ultimately on the same side.¹²¹

The Soviet Jewry movement, as such, functioned as a bridge that enabled the Orthodox to move relatively smoothly toward a broader, less parochial type of Jewish activity. Viewed from this perspective, it is notable that, for the non-Orthodox, it seems to have had exactly the opposite effect. That is, the veterans of the civil rights and anti-war movements discovered the Soviet Jewry movement en masse in the early 1970s. For them, it was part of the process of introducing greater particularism and ethnic pride into their solid, universal, liberal foundations. While Soviet Jewry activism may have created a space for Orthodoxy "outside the shul," for the non-Orthodox, it actually served to bring them back inside.¹²²

Solidarity Orthodoxy

Moving Modern Orthodoxy outside the synagogue, as manifest in its role in the Soviet Jewry movement, represented a broadening of the range of behavior that could be termed its core activities. Implicit in this expansion was a fundamental transformation in the nature of Modern Orthodoxy.¹²³ In his now classic 1965 article cited above that explores the distinctions between the modernist and traditionalist camps in American Orthodoxy, Charles Liebman introduced the dichotomy between church and sect first articulated by Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch.¹²⁴ Liebman described the Modern Orthodox as a broad "church-like" framework due to their willingness to include within their synagogues many Jews who do not live according to the ideal