Sociology and the Synagogue, Week 2: Trust R' Mordechai Torczyner – torczyner@torontotorah.com



Defining "Trust"

1. Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and the Global Economy, Foreign Affairs (September/October 1995)

Conventional maps of the global economy divide the major players into three groups: the United States and its partners in the North American Free Trade Agreement, the European Union (EU), and East Asia, led by Japan... This three-pronged geography is said to correspond to major divisions in the approach to political economy: at one pole lie Japan and the newly industrialized Asian economies, which have relied heavily on state-centered industrial policies to guide their development, while at the other extreme lies the United States, with its commitment to free-market liberalism. Europe, with its extensive social welfare policies, lies somewhere in between.

This familiar map, while not wrong, is today not the most useful way of understanding global economic geography. The most striking difference among capitalist countries is their <u>industrial structure</u>. Germany, Japan, and the United States were quick to adopt the corporate form of organization as they industrialized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and today their economies are hosts to <u>giant, professionally managed corporations</u> like Siemens, Toyota, Ford, and Motorola. By contrast, the private sectors of France, Italy, and capitalist Chinese societies like Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the marketized parts of the People's Republic of China (PRC) are dominated by <u>smaller, family-owned and -managed businesses</u>. These societies have had much greater difficulties institutionalizing large-scale private corporations; their relatively small companies, while dynamic, tend to fall apart after a generation or two, whereupon the state is tempted to step in to make possible large-scale industry.

The reasons for these differences in industrial structure have less to do with level of development than with a key cultural characteristic, what the sociologist James Coleman has labeled <u>social capital</u>—that is, the component of human capital that allows members of a given society to trust one another and cooperate in the formation of new groups and associations... [T]he strong historical propensity of Americans to form voluntary associations is quite similar to that of the Japanese, and it is no accident that these two societies pioneered the development first of the corporate form of business organization and later the smaller, decentralized network.

Virtually all economic activity... is carried out not by individuals but by organizations that require a high degree of social cooperation. As economists argue, the ability to form organizations depends on institutions like property rights, contracts, and a system of commercial law. But it also depends on a prior sense of moral community, that is, an unwritten set of ethical rules or norms that serve as the basis of social trust. Trust can dramatically reduce what economists call transaction costs—costs of negotiation, enforcement, and the like—and makes possible certain efficient forms of economic organization that otherwise would be encumbered by extensive rules, contracts, litigation, and bureaucracy. Moral communities, as they are lived and experienced by their members, tend to be the product not of rational choice in the economists' sense of the term, but of nonrational habit.

The value of trust in Torah

2. Ecclesiastes 4:9-12

Two are better than one, for they receive good reward for their struggle. Should they fall, one would pick up the other; if an individual would fall, he would have no second to pick him up. Also, if two would lie down they would be warm; how would an individual be warmed? And if an individual would be overcome in an attack, two would stand against him; and the triple-corded thread will not quickly break.

3. Rashi to Genesis 11:19

What is worse, that of the Flood generation or that of the Division generation? These did not reach out against Gd and these did reach out against Gd, as though they could wage war against Him, and yet these were drowned and these were not eliminated from the world! But the Flood generation were thieves and had quarrels among themselves and so they were eliminated, and these acted with love and friendship among themselves, as the Torah describes, "One tongue and many words." We learn that division is hated and peace is great.

4. Negative examples Joseph and his brothers; King Saul and King David

5. Responsa of Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet (13th century Spain) 1:430

You asked: May we trust a person who is suspected of a transgression regarding prohibitions, or not?

He is credible regarding other prohibitions, for we learn (Talmud, Chullin 5a) that one who is a *mumar* for one matter is not considered a *mumar* for the entire Torah, other than one who is a *mumar* for idolatry or violating Shabbat in public, who is considered like a *mumar* for the entire Torah.

6. Rabbi Moses Maimonides (12th century Egypt), Mishneh Torah, Laws of Tithes 10:2

If a sage dies, leaving produce, they may be assumed to have been tithed – even if they were collected only that day.

The special trust needs of synagogues

What steps does Judaism offer for creating trust?

7. Mishnah, Shekalim 3:2

The tither could not enter with hemmed clothes, shoes, sandals, tefillin or amulets, lest he become poor such that people might say he was impoverished because of sinning with the *shekalim*, or lest he become wealthy such that people might say he was enriched by the *shekalim*.

8. Code of Jewish Law (16th century Israel, Poland) Yoreh Deah 257:2

Mechaber: We do not demand accounts of tzedakah from collectors...

<u>Rama</u>: But it is good for them to present accounts, to fulfill the verse, "And you shall be innocent from Gd and from Israel." And the above is where we have collectors who are known to be righteous; otherwise, or where they have taken the position through their strength, they must offer accounts. The same is true for all communal appointees.

9. Talmud, Berachot 3a

There are three reasons why we do not enter a ruin: Suspicion, Collapse and Harmful forces.

10. Talmud, Shabbat 64b

Rav Yehudah said, citing Rav: Whenever the sages prohibited a practice because of appearances, it is prohibited even in rooms within rooms.

11. Midrash, Avot d'Rabbi Natan 8:7

Once, a young girl was taken captive and two pious men went to redeem her. One of them entered a hut of *zonot*, and when he emerged he asked the other, "What did you suspect of me?"

The other replied, "Perhaps you entered to find out how much money they were demanding for her release."

He said, "By the Avodah, so it was! And just as you judged me for the side of merit, so may Gd judge you for the side of merit."

12. Jeremiah 40:14

And he said to him: Do you know that Balis, King of Amon, has sent Yishmael ben Netanyah to kill you? And Gedaliah ben Achikam did not believe him.

13. Talmud, Gittin 61a

We support non-Jewish paupers with Jewish paupers, and we examine non-Jewish ill with Jewish ill, and we bury non-Jewish dead with Jewish dead, because of peaceful practices.

14. Mishnah, Shekalim 3:2

One is obligated to satisfy others as he is obligated to satisfy Gd, as it is written (Bamidbar 32), 'And you shall be innocent from Gd and Israel,' and it is written (Proverbs 3), 'And you will find favor and [a reputation for] wisdom in the eyes of Gd and Man.'

15. Trust and Matzah

The relationship between human and Gd

16. Rabbi Moses Maimonides (12th century Egypt), Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance 2:2

What is repentance? For the sinner to abandon his sin and remove it from his thoughts, and conclude in his heart that he will never commit it again... the One who knows all hidden things will testify that he will never return to this sin...